The costs and benefits of regulation : implications for developing countries by Guasch, J. Luis & Hahn, Robert W.
WIPS IWS1
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1773
The Costs and Benefits  This paper  examines the
economic impact  of
of Regulation  regulation in industrial and
developing countries. it
Implications  for  Developing  argues  that  economic  analysis Implications  for  Developing  cnpa  r  mon  oei can)  play  an important  roale  in
Countries  restructuring reclulated
industries  and dleveloping
J. Luis  Guasch  more effective egulations.
Robert W. Hahn  and in reducirig  politically
driven regulation and
capture.
Background paper for World Development Report 1997
The World Bank
Office of the Chief Economist and Senior Vice President
Development Economics
and


















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1773
Summary  findings
The past  two  decades  have seen an  unparalleled  rise in  prices  and entry  into markets  that  would  otherwise  be
new health,  safety,  and  environmental  regulations  in  workably  competitive  - can limit  growth  and
industrial  countries.  At the  same  time,  in some countries  significantly  reduce  economic  welfare.
there  has been  substantial  economic  deregulation  of  Although  unnecessary  process  regulation  can  hurt  the
several  industries  (including  airlines,  railroads,  trucking,  economy,  social  regulations  may  significantly  benefit  the
energy,  telecommunications,  and financial  markets).  average  consumer.  But some regulations  do  not  meet
Developing  countries  are engaged  in deregulating  some  goals effectively  and  may  sometimes  reduce  living
sectors  of the  economy  and devising  new regulatory  standards.
frameworks  for  others.  After  reviewing  the literature,  Developing  countries  can  consider  several  regulatory
Guasch  and  Hahn  provide  an overview  of the costs and  policies,  tools,  and  frameworks  to improve  their
benefits  of regulation  throughout  the world,  highlight  approach  to regulation.  What  they  choose  will  depend
the  potential  gains from  reform  of regulation  and  on available  administrative  expertise  and  resources,  as
deregulation  in both  industrial  and developing  countries,  well  as political  constraints  and  economic  impacts.
draw  lessons from  experience  with  government  Generally,  local  and  national  capabilities  for  evaluating
regulation,  and suggest  how  to  improve  regulation  in  regulation  need to be improved.
developing  countries.  Regulation  is not  generally  undesirable,  but  it often  has
They  find  that  it is possible  to explore  systematically  undesirable  economic  consequences,  which  result  in part
the  costs and benefits  of regulatory  activities  using  from  political  forces to redistribute  wealth.  These  forces
standard  economic  analysis.  They  conclude  that  need can  be mitigated  by more  sharply  evaluating  the
regulation  -especially  regulation  aimed  at controlling  consequences  and tradeoffs  of proposed  regulations.
This paper-a  joint  product  of the Office of the Chief Economist  and Senior Vice President,  Development  Economics  and
the Advisory  Group,  Latin America  and the Caribbean  Technical  Department  - was produced  as a background  paper  for
World Development  Report  1997  on the  role of the state  in a changing  world.  Copies  of the paper  are available  free from
the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contactJoy  Troncoso,  room  18-314,  telephone  202-
202-473-8606,  fax 202-676-0239,  Internet  address  jtroncoso@worldbank.org.  June  1997.  (24 pages)
The Poitcy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  btissemintes  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  aboat
develo  pment issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are iess than fully  polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretationts.  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily  represent the view of the World Bank, its Execuxtive  Directors, or the
|countries  they represent.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterThe Costs and Benefits of Regulation:
Implications  for Developing  Countries*
J. Luis Guasch and Robert W. Hahn
* J. Luis Guasch  is Advisor/Lead  Economist  for Latin America  and the Caribbean,  The World Bank  and Professor
of Economics, University of California, San Diego.  Robert W. Hahn is Resident Scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute  and Adjunct Professor  of Economics  at Carnegie Mellon University. The authors thank Ed
Campos  and Michael  Klein for their helpful comments  and Jonathan  Siskin, Lisa Taber, Fumie  Yokota,  Lisa Bustin
and Elizabeth  Cooper for their excellent  research  assistance.
This manuscript  was  prepared  as a background  paper for the World Bank, World Development Report, forthcoming
in 1997.The Costs and Benefits  of Regulation:




I.  Introduction ........................................  1
II.  Regulation: Definition,  Retionale and Problems ......................  2
Ill.  The Costs and Benefits  of Regulation  .............................  5
IV.  Assessing  the Gains from Regulatory  Reform  .......................  13
Social Regulation ...................................  13
Economic  Regulation  .................................  16
V.  Conclusions  .........................................  25
References  ............................  29Executive  Summary
In developed  countries, the past two decades have witnessed an unparalleled  rise in
new regulations  related to the environment,  health, and safety. During this period, there also
has been substantial  economic  deregulation  of several industries in some countries, including
airlines, trucking, railroads, financial  markets, energy and telecommunications.  Developing
countries are engaged in deregulating  various sectors of the economy and devising  new
regulatory frameworks  for others.
This paper has three objectives: first, to provide an overview of the costs and
benefits of regulation  throughout  the world; second, to highlight  the potential  gains from the
reform of regulation  and deregulation  in developed  and developing  countries; and third, to
glean some fundamental  lessons from the experience  with government  regulation  and make
suggestions  for improving  regulation  in developing  countries.
The review of the literature on the benefits and costs demonstrates  that it is possible
to systematically  explore the costs and benefits of regulatory  activity using standard economic
analysis. It also shows  that regulation  can have a significant  adverse impact  on economic
growth. Specifically,  regulation  aimed at controlling  prices and entry into markets that would
otherwise  be workably competitive  is likely to reduce welfare, growth and the average
standard of living significantly. In addition, process regulation  that is unnecessary  can
impose a significant  cost on the economy. Nonetheless,  social regulations  may have
significant  net benefits for the average consumer. At the same time, these regulations  may
not meet goals in an effective  manner and in some cases may result in a net decline in living
standards.
There are several policies  developing  countries might consider adopting  to improve
their general approach  to regulation. The appropriate  regulatory  tool and framework will
depend  on several factors, including  bureaucratic  expertise, resource availability,  political
constraints  and economic  impacts.  There is a general need to enhance  the capability  for
evaluating  regulation  at local and national levels.
The overall lesson is not that regulation  is generally  undesirable,  but that it often has
undesirable  economic  consequences. Moreover, these impacts  result partly from political
forces that lead to certain kinds of wealth redistribution. While not denying such forces, we
believe they can be mitigated  by more sharply evaluating  the consequences  and tradeoffs
involved  in regulating  before policies are implemented.The Costs and Benefits of Regulation:
Some Implications for Developing Countries
I.  Introduction
In developed countries, the past two decades have witnessed an unparalleled rise in
new regulations related to the environment, health, and safety. During this period, there also
has been substantial economic deregulation of several industries in some countries, including
airlines,  trucking, railroads,  financial markets, energy and telecommunications.  At the same
time, developing countries, complementing their far reaching privatization programs,  are
engaged in deregulating various sectors of the economy and devising new regulatory
frameworks for others.
This trend toward economic regulatory reform is likely to continue as a result of the
globalization of markets.  Regulators are becoming more constrained by the increased
mobility of capital and labor (Lee and McKenzie,  1991).  If they choose to keep prices
substantially above the costs of production, firms will consider moving to a more hospitable
economic environment or find a way to bypass the system.  One example is the state-
sanctioned telephone monopoly in some countries.  Increasingly, consumers and businesses
are finding ways around these monopolies by making use of internet services and services
that provide long distance calls more cheaply.  This natural tendency to avoid paying
monopoly prices leads to increased pressure for deregulation and privatization.
As the political costs of regulating specific sectors of the economy increase,
politicians will see deregulation as a cost-effective strategy for promoting growth.  Other
things equal, those countries where the economic and political gains are likely to be greatest
can be expected to proceed the most rapidly.  Those industries with a more complicated
economic structure, such as electricity and telecommunications, can be expected to be
deregulated more slowly.
Not all regulation is on the decline, however.  Citizens in many countries express a
desire for more regulation in several areas, such as environmental protection, public health
and safety standards.  The increased interest in regulating these areas can be partly explained
by increases in income.  As consumers become wealthier, they demand more amenities, such
as cleaner air and water and better sanitation.  As these demands increase, politicians will
supply more of these goods and services, but they will also explore ways of supplying them
more efficiently.
Current political concerns with limiting tax increases in many countries are creating
even more incentives to use certain kinds of regulation.  When legislators constrain
themselves in terms of spending and taxes, regulation can be a useful tool for achieving
political objectives, such as transferring wealth to particular interest groups in exchange for
political support.  In this kind of political environment, legislators substitute regulatory
requirements or mandates whose costs are not directly paid for by taxpayers with less visible,
but nonetheless real, costs.  From the government's  perspective, the effort appears to be2
relatively low-cost. The federal budget is barely affected when a major change is mandated
by regulation.
The impact of regulatory activity on country economies continues to be hotly debated.
While few would deny that regulation can increase consumer welfare, this depends on how
regulation is designed and implemented, and the specific problem it is attempting to solve.
Moreover,  regulation can add substantially to the costs of doing business, and these costs
frequently are passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices.
This paper has three objectives:  first, to provide an overview of the costs and
benefits of regulation throughout the world; second, to highlight the potential gains from the
reform of regulation and deregulation in developed and developing countries; and third, to
glean some fundamental lessons from the experience with government regulation and make
suggestions for improving regulation in developing countries.  Given the scarcity of data on
this subject in developing countries, most of the data presented here comes from the United
States and other developed countries.
Section 2 defines regulation and explains its justification  as well as the root causes of
its inefficiencies.  Section 3 reviews the literature on the aggregate costs and benefits of
regulation.'  Section 4 provides some general estimates of the potential gains from reform
and a more detailed analysis of the potential for structural reform of specific industries in
developed and developing countries.  Finally, Section 5 presents the key findings and offers
some policy recommendations.
II.  Regulation:  Definition,  Rationale and Problems
There are many types of regulation.  While some overlap is inescapable, a common
classification scheme consists of three parts:  economic, social and process regulation.
Economic regulation refers to restrictions on prices,  quantity, entrance and exit conditions
for specific industries.  Social regulation refers to regulations that affect a wide array of
industries.  Typically, environmental,  public health and safety regulation are placed in this
category.  Finally, process regulation refers to government management of the operation of
the public and private sector,  such as paperwork requirements and administrative costs
incurred by both producers  and consumers.  These categories are not as neat and tidy as they
might first appear.  Paperwork  requirements, for example, might be a significant component
of some social regulation, such as environmental protection or worker safety.  Moreover,
some regulations,  such as those affecting education and social services, do not fit neatly into
any particular category here.  Despite these deficiencies, this framework is a useful starting
point for measuring many of the most important costs and benefits of regulation.
I  All estimates  presented  in this paper are expressed  in the year dollars  of the original  study.3
There are several economic arguments supporting regulation (MacAvoy,  1992).  The
most common ones are based on correcting for market failure or on equity considerations.
In the case of social regulation, a primary rationale is that individual companies may not take
into account the full social cost of their actions without government intervention.  For
example, a firm will tend to pollute excessively unless it incurs some implicit or explicit cost
for polluting.  In the case of workplace safety, workers may not have adequate information
on hazards to make fully informed choices.  Direct regulation represents one approach to the
problem of obtaining such information.  In the case of economic regulation, the primary
economic rationale has to do with the potential for improving production efficiency.  If there
are economies of scale or scope,  a single firm may, in theory, be able to produce more
efficiently than several competing firms, but then its monopolistic power may need to be
restrained through regulation.  In addition, there may be additional value to consumers as
more consumers use a network,  such as telephones.2  While it is possible to provide some
economic rationales for regulation for a wide range of economic activity, such rationales are
often not persuasive in practice.  Just as there  is potential for many kinds of "market
failure,"  there is also potential for  "government failure. "
There are two reasons for inefficient regulation.  One is economic and the other is
political.  The economic reason is that it is difficult for a government authority to regulate
companies because it lacks the necessary information.  For example, a business might have a
good idea of its cost and demand structure,  but a regulator typically does not have access to
such information.  The firm usually is better informed than the regulator; moreover,  it rarely
has an incentive to tell the regulator all it knows.  Such "information asymmetries"  imply
that economic regulation will rarely achieve a "first-best" or efficient outcome.  That does
not mean that regulation is not a useful approach for increasing economic efficiency when an
industry is subject to increasing returns to scale or there are network externalities.  It does
mean, however,  that the effectiveness of regulation is limited and that it has some serious
structural defects.  These defects need to be kept in mind when comparing this approach with
viable alternatives.
Similarly, the regulator  imposing social regulation must frequently base decisions on
very limited information (Lewis,  1996).  For example, in setting the overall emission
limitation for acid rain, the U.S.  government had some crude estimates of the costs and
benefits.  After the program was implemented, however,  the costs of achieving the emission
standard were lower than expected.  The lower costs resulted in part because of the
flexibility inherent in the market-based regulatory approach that was adopted.  At the same
time, unforeseen changes in energy and transportation markets also played an important role.
Political problems with regulation also lead to inefficient economic results.  Since
regulation redistributes resources and rents, politicians often use it to secure political gains
2  For example,  email will be more useful to a user if more people have email addresses. On the subject of
the economics  of networks, see Klein (1996), Katz and Shapiro (1991), Liebowitz  and Margolis  (1994), and
White  (1997).4
rather than to correct  market failures.  A large array of regulatory  instruments, such as
quotas, licenses,  and subsidies, are used to transfer significant amounts of wealth from
consumers to small groups of producers.  The result is often that regulation is inefficient.
Some classic examples arise in the area of U.S.  agriculture,  including peanuts (see Box 1),
sugar, and dairy products.  Moreover,  the wealth transfers also arise in social regulation.
Environmental and energy regulations that involve mandates frequently carry a heavy price
tag.  For example, Anderson et al. (1995) estimate the savings from the use of market
incentives in environmental regulation at US$8 billion (1986 dollars) in 1992 and project that
potential savings in 2000 could be as high as US$38 billion,  or 26% of estimated compliance
costs.  When transfers are this large, beneficiaries will be willing to expend considerable
resources on lobbying and other activities that enhance their earnings and protect these
transfers,  even when there are huge efficiency costs to the economy as a whole.
Box 1
The U.S.  Peanut Market
An example  of a small group's benefiting  from regulation  at the cost of a large group is the peanut-
quota system.  Since 1949 the federal government  has run a program that limits the number of
farmers who can sell peanuts in the United States. Imports are also severely restricted. On top of
these restrictions, price supports are used to guarantee  that farmers with peanut quotas can cover
their production  costs each years. This generally results in the minimum  selling price being about
50 percent higher than the world price.  For 1982-1987,  it was estimated  that the average annual
consumer-to-producer  transfer was $225 million (in 1987 dollars) with an associated deadweight
loss of $34 million  (Rucker  and Thurman, 1990). In 1982  there were 23,046 peanut farmers, which
means that on average each received  a net transfer of $11,000. In contrast, the cost to the average
consumer of this program was only $1.23.  Few consumers would be willing to spend their own
time and money  to dismantle  the peanut program when they would only gain $1.23.  However, the
program is worth $11,000 to the average peanut farmer and that would certainly make it worth
one's while  to see that the program  continues.
Source:  Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington  (1996)
Of course,  if regulation becomes very inefficient and visible, there may be pressure
for change.  Firms with new technologies may lobby for reduced regulation. In addition,
consumers and businesses may find ways of buying products and services at lower prices by
opting out of the regulated markets.  For regulation in tradable goods markets, the pressures
to deregulate will come from declining market shares of domestic producers  who are
vulnerable to less regulated imports.  In addition, tradable goods producers that rely on
heavily regulated non-tradable goods sectors will have an interest in facilitating deregulation
of these sectors to lower their overall productions costs.5
Another source of pressure for regulatory  reform comes from scholarship  that
documents  the costs of regulation. As noted above, as technology  evolves, we find that there
are fewer industries  in which classic economic  regulation  can be justified on efficiency
grounds.  In addition, economists  have also documented  a wide array of cases in which more
flexible  regulation, such as performance  standards  and market-based  approaches,  can achieve
better results at a lower cost (Hahn, 1996; Anderson  et al.,  1995)
III.  The Costs and  Benefits  of Regulation
Most systematic economic studies of regulation have focused on federal regulation in
the United States (Weidenbaum and DeFina,  1978; Litan and Nordhaus,  1983; Hahn and
Hird,  1991; Hopkins,  1992; Winston, 1993).  The first study to synthesize data on the costs
and benefits of regulation was done by Hahn and Hird  (1991).  Table 1 and Table 2 provide
estimates for the costs of economic regulation and the costs and benefits of social regulation.
Hahn and Hird demonstrate four key ideas.  First,  it is possible to systematically explore the
costs and benefits of regulatory activity using standard economic analysis.  Second, the
efficiency costs of economic regulation appear to be much smaller than the costs associated
with transfers (e.g.,  between producers and consumers).  Third, such information can be
useful in gaining a better understanding of the economic impacts of regulation.  Fourth,  there
is a great deal of uncertainty in the data, and these uncertainties  should be conveyed as
clearly as possible to policy makers.
Focusing on the cost side of regulation, Hopkins (1992) has extended the work of
Hahn and Hird.  Hopkins' principal insight is that the costs of process regulation are
substantial. Table 3 provides estimates of the cost of social, economic, and process regulation
as of 1991 and  for selected years from  1977-2000.  The total cost of regulation in 1991 is
estimated at US$542 billion (1991 dollars), or about 9.5 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). 3 The largest component of those regulatory cost was process regulation, or US$189
billion in annual expenditures related to government paperwork requirements,  primarily for
tax compliance.  The tax compliance costs do not necessarily represent efficiency costs,
however,  since one must consider all aspects of a tax system in evaluating its impact on
efficiency.  Nonetheless, the shear magnitude of the process costs suggest that paperwork
could be reduced dramatically while improving efficiency.
I  Hopkins' estimate  for the total cost of regulation  includes  transfer  costs.  Total costs without  transfer
costs are $412 billion.6
Table  1
Annual  Costs of Economic  Regulation  in the United  States in  1988
(in Billions of 1988 Dollars)
Regulated  Sector  Efficiency  Costs  Transfers  Sourcesb
International Trade  17.3  85.6-110.6  Hufbauer (1986)
Telecommunications  < 14.1  <  42.3a  Wenders (1987)
Agricultural Price  6.7  18.4  Gardner (1987)
Supports  l
Airline  3.8  7.7  Morrison & Winston (1986,
_____  ____  ____  ____  1989)
Rail  2.3  6.8a  Winston (1985)
Postal Rates  na  4-12  President's  Commission on
Privatization (1988)
Milk Marketing  0.4-0.9  0.9-3.5  Ippolito & Masson; Buxton &
Orders/Price  Supports  Hammond (reported in
MacAvoy (1977))
Natural Gasc  0.2-0.4  5.0  Loury  (1983)
Barge  0.2-0.3  0.6-0.9a  Litan & Nordhaus (1983)
Davis-Bacon Act  0.2a  0.5  Thiebolt (1975) (updated)
Credit  0.05-0.5  0.15-1.6a  Litan & Nordhaus (1983)
Ocean  0.05-0.08  0.15-0.22a  Jantscher (1975)
Trucking  od  0
Oil Price Controls  0  0
Cable TV  0  0
Total  $45.3-46.5  $172.1-209.5
na  not available
a  Figures estimated using 3:1 ratio of transfers to efficiency costs.
b  Indicates primary source of estimate.
c  Cost of natural gas regulation expected to approach zero as all price controls are lifted.
d  If estimate is zero, federal regulation is assumed to be negligible.
Source: Hahn and Hird (1991)7
Table 2
Annual Costs and Benefits of Social Regulation in the United States in 1988
(in Billions  of 1988 Dollars)
Regulated  Sector  Costs  Benefits  Sources
Environment  55.4-77.6  16.5-135.8  Hazilla  & Kopp (1990);
(58.4)a  Freeman  (1990); Portney
(1990)
Highway  Safety  6.4-9.0  25.4-45.7  Crandall  (1986)
Occupational  Safety and  8.5-9.0  negligible  Crandall  (1988); Denison
Health (OSHA)  (1979); Viscusi (1983)
Nuclear  Power  5.3-7.6  na  DOE policy study (1979
(reported  in Litan &
Nordhaus  (1983))
Drugs  <  1.5-3.0  na  Peltzman  (1973)
Equal  Employment  0.9  na  Weidenbaum  & DeFina
Opportunity  (EEO)  (1978); Litan & Nordhaus
l____________________ ________________________  (1983)
Consumer  Product  >  .034  na  U.S. Federal Budget,  FY
Safety  1990 (administrative  costs
_  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  o  n  ly )
Total  $78.0-107.1  $41.9-181.5
na  not available
Point estimate  is in parentheses.
b  Indicates  primary source  of estimates.
Source: Hahn and Hird (1991)
Table 3
Annual Costs of Federal Regulation in the United States
(in Billions of 1991 Dollars)
Regulations  1977  1988  1991  2000
Environmental  Regulation  42  87  115  178
Other Social  Regulation  29  30  36  61
Economic  Regulation-Efficiency  120  73  73  73
Process  Regulation  122  153  189  221
Subtotal  of Costs  313  343  413  533
Economic  Regulation-Transfers  228  130  130  130
Total Costs  540  473  542  662
Source: Hopkins (1992)8
To place the numbers in context, each American household would be billed US$5,683
(1991 dollars) annually in addition to its current taxes if this regulatory compliance cost were
shared equally and collected directly and not imposed on business instead. From another
perspective,  total federal spending in 1991 was aboat US$1,200 billion,  or approximately
twice the total cost of regulation. This two-to-one ratio between government spending and
regulatory costs certainly does not correspond to the relative emphasis each receives in either
the government's  statistics or its decisionmaking.
There are no aggregate estimates of the benefits and costs of regulation outside of the
United States.  In Australia, the total cost of regulation was estimated to be between 9 to 19
percent of GDP in 1986 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,  1996a).
Mihlar (1996) provides a preliminary estimate for the costs of regulation in Canada of 12
percent of GDP.  Based on an assumed ratio between private compliance costs and regulatory
program spending, he extrapolated national regulatory costs from federal and provincial
administrative budgets.  While the calculation is crude, it provides  a rough estimate of the
size of the regulatory burden.
Three points are worth noting about these regulatory cost estimates, since they are
often cited without careful analysis.  First,  the figures are highly uncertain and often
incomplete.  Yet, estimates as reported in the press and even scholarly papers sometimes fail
to reflect this uncertainty.  Second, the figures developed using this approach to cost
estimation are likely to understate the total impact of regulatory costs because they do not
include the adverse impact that regulation typically has on innovation.  Third, as shown in
Table 4,  the cost of regulation as a fraction of GDP is fairly significant for countries where
such estimates are readily available, ranging from 7 to 19 percent.  In addition, there are
significant benefits to deregulation. 4
4  The  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (1996b)  also  estimated  that  regulatory
reform programs  could increase  GDP in the long run by as much as 3.5 percent in the United Kingdom  and by
as much as 6 percent in Japan, Germany  and France.9
Table 4
Costs of Regulation and Gains from Deregulation'
(as a Percentage of GDP)
Countyy  Cost of Regulation  Projected Benefits  Source
of Economic
Deregulation
United States  7.2-9.5%  0.3%  Hopkins (1992)"; Winston (1993)c
Australia  9-19%  5.5%  OECD (1996a)d
Canada  11.8%  Mihlar (1996)'
Japan  2.3-18.7%  OECD (1996b)y
European Union  3-7%  OECD (1996b)g
Germany  0.3%  OECD (1996b)h
Netherlands  0.5-1.1%  OECD (1996b)'
a  These numbers are underestimates of the effects of deregulation since the studies do not include all
sectors where deregulation can be beneficial.
b  The cost estimates, as of  1991, include process costs.  The range reflects the inclusion of economic
transfers.
c  Winston estimated the gains of deregulation in the United States at 0.7-0.8%  of GDP in 1990.  The 0.3%
estimate represents the potential gains if the industries could achieve optimality.
d  The costs of regulation, as of 1986, are derived from Commonwealth (1986).  The projected benefits
from deregulation are based on both the Hilmer and related reforms (Industry Commission,  1995).  These
reforms essentially cover legislative and regulatory changes in order to provide a national competition
policy framework and to broaden the coverage of competition policy instruments.  They also cover moves
to foster competition in national infrastructure areas such as electricity,  gas, water and road transport.
e  The costs estimates are calculated in 1993-94.
f  Projections of savings from deregulation are based on reducing the price and productivity gap with the
United States.  See Shimpo and Nishizake (1996) for an overview of the studies.
g  Citing Emerson (1988).  Projections of savings from deregulation are based on dismantling technical trade
barriers and custom formalities, enhanced economies of scale and lower profit margins from enhanced
competition.
Citing Lipschitz, et al. (1989).  Projections of savings from deregulation are based on more market
oriented pricing in agriculture and mining, the dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers in selected
industries and reforms in product and labor markets.
Citing Van Sinderen, et al. (1994) and Van Bereijk and Haffner (1995).  Projections of savings from
deregulation are based on the reduction of product market rigidities in 20 major sectors of the Dutch
economy.10
Many studies have attempted to estimate the adverse impacts of regulation using
measures other than economic cost.  For example, Christainsen and Haveman (1981)
examined the effect of regulation on labor productivity and concluded that over  10 percent  of
the slowdown of the growth in labor productivity in the mid-1970s was due to the expansion
in federal regulation.5 MacAvoy (1992) examined the long-term growth effects of regulation
on eight industries from 1973 to  1987.  He found economy wide losses of 1.5-2.0 percent of
U.S.  gross national product (GNP).  Studies examining environmental, health and safety
regulation have yielded qualitatively similar impacts.  For example, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
(1992) found the cost of pollution control was associated with a reduction of over 2.5 percent
of U.S.  GNP over the period between  1974 and 1985.  In an examination of the impact of
environmental and occupational health and safety regulation on the manufacturing sector,
Robinson (1995) concluded that the cumulative effect was to reduce multifactor productivity
by more than 10% over a twelve year period.6
Other studies describe the relationship between regulation and output growth.  For
example, Friedman (1995) argues that the growth in regulation is at least, in part,
responsible for the slowdown in economic growth.  In a study of eleven OECD countries,
Koedijk and Kremers (1996) tested the relationship between market regulation and output
growth,  shown in Figure 1.  They constructed an index of regulatory intensity in the
countries,  and showed a sharp negative correlation between regulatory  intensity and output
growth.  The countries with the least regulation enjoyed the highest growth in output per
person.  The measures the authors construct are admittedly crude, but they probably serve as
a proxy for the degree to which markets are regulated in different countries.
The economic impact of different labor regulations on employment growth can be seen
in Table 5.  The table suggests that countries with less onerous labor market restrictions (at
the top of the table) enjoyed robust employment growth, while countries with more severe
restrictions (at the bottom of the table) suffer declining employment growth.  While many
other factors can affect employment growth, there are strong reasons to believe that flexible
labor market policies are likely to increase employment (Guasch, 1997).
The preceding tables and figures present the overall trends in regulatory  costs and
impacts, but they fall short of providing a basis for ultimate judgments about specific
regulations.  Such judgments require information on the benefits of regulation as well as its
costs.  More important still, they require analysis of incremental rather than total effects.
Only then is it possible to assess whether a the economic benefits of a particular proposal
outweigh its costs.
5  The authors estimated  that between  12 and 21 percent of the slowdown  in the growth  of labor productivity
in U.S. manufacturing  during 1973-77,  as compared  with 1958-65,  was due to the expansion  of federal
regulation.
6  The incremental  impact  of regulation  grew from a 1.1  % annual  reduction  in multifactor  productivity  in
1974-1975  to a 2.5% annual reduction  in 1985-1986.11
Table  5
Labor  Regulations
Country  Payroll  Severance  Employment  Unemployment  Collective
Taxesa  Payments'  Growth  Rate  (1996)  Bargaining
(1992-1995)'
Australia  27.8  Low  1.0  9.0  Centralized
Chile  20.9  Low  2.3  6.3  Firm Level
Japan  22.9  None  0.6  2.5  Firm Level
Malaysia  24.3  Low  3.3  2.8  Firm Level
New Zealand  11.5  None  1.4  8.0  Firm Level
United States  20.1  None  1.8  5.5  Firm Level
Argentina  50  _  0d  High  -0.7  17.2  Centralized
France  54.7  High  -0.4  11.6  Centralized
Italy  52.8  High  -1.7  10.2  Centralized
Spain  38.2  High  -1.6  22.4  Centralized
a  Payroll taxes are firm donations plus obligatory personal contributions.  The values for France,  Spain, Italy
and Japan correspond to 1994, those for Malaysia to 1995, and those for Argentina and Chile to 1996.
b  Severance payments based on OECD indexes.
c  Employment growth is measured as annual average percentage growth.
d  Argentina amended its labor laws in 1996, and payroll taxes now average 41.0.
Source:  Guasch (1997)11
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IV.  Assessing the Gains  from  Regulatory  Reform
While information on the economic impacts of regulation is limited, there is a fairly
comprehensive database in the United States and in some other countries that provides a good
indication of the scope for regulatory reform.  Moreover,  several countries are in the process
of developing useful information that would help streamline the regulatory process (see Box
2).  Here,  we first examine the potential for improving social regulation and then examine
the potential gains from reforming economic regulation.
Box 2
Regulatory  Reform  in Mexico
The government  of Mexico is now implementing  a far-reaching  program to carefully  examine  the
country's regulatory  structure at the federal, state, and local levels. The aims  of the Agreement  for
the Deregulation  of Business  Activity include streamlining  federal regulation,  reducing corruption
by codifying regulation, and helping to promote more efficient and effective regulation.  The
program, while new, has enjoyed  some early successes. Recent  legislation  simplifies  administrative
procedures, requires a quicker administrative  response time, and reduces paperwork for foreign
investors. In addition, a series of legal reforms aims to simplify  court proceedings  and reduce the
costs of commercial  lending. As a result of these reforms, Mexico City's Superior Court reports
that the number  of civil trials filed decreased by 24% from 1995  to 1996. Agency-by-agency  rule
simplification  and elimination  is also proceeding swiftly.  For example, the approval time for a
business requiring health, safety, and environmental  controls to begin operation has been reduced
from an average of over 200 working  days to a maximum  of 21 working days. Finally, a complete
inventory  of federal rules in effect are available on the internet.  Making such information  more
easily accessible  should help to reduce corruption  and compliance  costs.
Source: Secretaria  De Comercio Y Fomento  Industrial  (1996)
Social Regulation
In the area of social regulation, it is essential to examine the likely impact of
individual regulations.  Hahn (1996) has compiled the most comprehensive analysis of the
benefits and costs of recent regulation based on studies by government agencies.  He
surveyed over ninety Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) for environmental, health, and
safety rules from  1990 to mid-1995 and found that there is considerable variation in the type
and quality of analysis agencies perform for individual rules.  Benefit analyses were often
incomplete, and in less than 20 percent of the rules did agencies show that quantified
monetary benefits would exceed quantified costs.
To make the analysis consistent across different programs and regulations, he
converted dollar estimates to  1994 dollars, and introduced a common discount rate as well as14
a consistent set of values for reducing health risks.  The results are summarized in Figure 2,
which provides an overview of the distribution of net benefits of 54 final regulations.  The
left side of the figure shows the number of rules with net costs that fall in various categories.
The right side of the figure shows the number of rules with net benefits that fall in various
categories.  The figure illustrates that average benefit for a rule with net benefits exceeds the
average cost for a rule with net costs.
Several conclusions emerge from his analysis.  First, using government agency data,
it would appear that there is a present value of about US$280 billion (1994 dollars) in net
benefits to government regulation in those areas since 1990.  Yet over half the final rules
would not pass a benefit-cost test, even when we use government agencies'  numbers.
Aggregate net benefits are positive because many of the rules that do pass have substantial
benefits.  Eliminating final rules that would not pass a benefit-cost test could increase the
present value of net benefits by more than US$115 billion.
There are reasons, however,  not to take the agency numbers at face value.  Both
theory and empirical evidence suggest that agencies are likely to overstate substantially the
aggregate numbers for net benefits.  Agencies with a single objective (e.g.,  protecting the
environment improving safety in the workplace) have an incentive to overstate the benefits of
their program relative to the costs so that they can better meet the demands of interest
groups.
Another measure of the impact of regulations is how many lives a regulation is likely
to save. Interestingly, a review of several final and proposed regulations reveals the amount
spent for each premature death that would be avoided because of the existence of the
regulation varies over eight orders of magnitude - from roughly US$100,000 to over US$5
trillion (1990 dollars) (Morrall,  1986)!  This suggests that regulations could be developed
that would prevent many more premature deaths while still saving consumers'  money.
Recent studies have attempted to quantify potential gains in both the United States and
abroad.  Reallocating the current  U.S.  investment in  185 life-saving interventions could avert
an additional 60,000 deaths, or twice that of the status quo (Tengs and Graham,  1996).  In
addition, reallocating recent domestic regulatory expenditures of about US$8 billion (1994
dollars) could save more than 100 million additional life-years in developing countries (Hahn,
1996).FIGURE 2
Distribution of Net Benefits of Fifty-four U.S. Regulations, 1990 to Mid-1995
(in Billions of 1994 Dollars)
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Economic Regulation
There was much economic deregulation in developed countries in the late  1970s and
early 1980s, particularly in transportation and energy.  Since the early 1980s, however,
economic regulation has not advanced very rapidly even though there is ample room for
further deregulation in areas such as telecommunications, electricity and the financial services
(Noll,  1997). Developing countries have been late entrants in the move toward deregulation,
but are quickly catching up.  Indeed, some countries, such as Chile, have progressed even
further than most developed countries.  And some countries in the Latin America and
Caribbean region, such as Argentina,  El Salvador, Peru and Mexico, are undertaking major
economic deregulation initiatives.
In this section, we review additional evidence on the potential benefits from economic
deregulation.  We will first consider the developed countries with a focus on the U.S.
experience and other OECD countries and then examine the record of the developing
countries.
Developed Countries
The overall welfare gains from deregulation across sectors in the United States have
been substantial.  The focus was eliminating entry and exit restrictions  and freeing prices to
their market levels.  Table 6, taken from Winston (1993) shows more recent estimates for the
benefits of deregulation as well the potential gains from further reform.  Aggregate welfare
gains amounted to US$35 to US$46 billion (1990 dollars) per  year. Consumers had annual
gains of US$32 to US$43 billion per year from lower prices and better services.  Producers
gained about US$3 billion per year from increased efficiency and lower costs.  Winston
estimates that additional gains from remaining distortions could be in excess of US$20-plus
billion per year.
However, there is evidence that the gains from deregulation that economists have
estimated are likely to be significantly understated.  In a recent paper, Winston (1996) argues
that the time it takes for industry to adjust to the new deregulated environment is substantial.
Winston notes that although industry may adjust prices to reflect marginal costs quickly after
deregulation, it takes time to optimize production.  He argues that policymakers and the
public tend to notice only the short term effects and, therefore,  undervalue the benefits of
deregulation.  Frequently,  the positive impact that deregulation has on innovation is
overlooked.  Innovations in technologies and operations sparked by deregulation increased
productivity and reduced operating costs by 24 to over 50 percent in different industries.
Sectoral studies examining the effect of regulation yield similar results on the adverse
consequences of economic regulation.  Caves,  Christensen, and Swanson (1981) undertook a
cross-country study to compare total productivity growth for U.S.  railroads from  1956 to
1974 to the growth achieved by Canadian railroads over the same period.  Both industries
had access to the same technology, but Canadian railroads were subject to less regulation
than U.S.  railroads.  The authors argue that regulation substantially reduced productivity17
growth and estimate that, if the United States had experienced the same growth as Canada,
the cost of providing rail services in 1974 would have been US$13.8 billion (1985 dollars)
lower.7 After railroad deregulation in the United States, Willig and Baumol (1987)
estimated that between  1980 and 1985 annual operating expenses dropped 26 percent  while
traffic volume remained virtually unchanged.  Deregulation of the rail sector also led to
increases in investment.
Table  6
Welfare Gains from Deregulation in the United States in 1990
(in Billions of 1990 Dollars)
Industry  Consumers  Producers  Total  Further
Potential Gains
Airlines  8.8-14.8  4.9  13.7-19.7  4.9
Railways  7.2-9.7  3.2  10.4-12.9  0.4
Road Freight  15.4  (4.8)  10.6  0
Telecommunications  0.7-1.6  0.7-1.6  11.8
Cable Television  0.4-1.3  - 0.4-1.3  0.4-0.8
Brokerage  0.1  (0.1)  0  0
Natural Gas  4.1
Total  32.6-43.0  3.2  35.8-46.2  21.6-22.0
Source: Winston (1993)
7  While average total productivity growth for Canadian railroads during the period was 3.3 percent per
year, it was only 0.5  percent for U.S.  railroads.18
Deregulation of the trucking sector led to major improvements in efficiency.'  The
annual welfare loss due to allocative inefficiency resulting from regulation of rail and motor
carriers rates has been estimated to be US$1 billion to US$4 billion (1977 dollars)
(Braeutigam and Noll,  1984; Winston, Corsi,  Grimm and Evans,  1990).
A comparison of the pre-and post-deregulated U.S.  airline industry also provides
striking evidence of regulation's  impact on productivity and production costs.  Cost per unit
of service were reduced by approximately 25 percent  and were accompanied by sharp work
force reductions 9 with little effect on output in the first few years following deregulation
(Caves, Christensen, Tretheway,  and Windle,  1987).'°  In addition, excess capacity
decreased and productivity increased.  Morrison and Winston (1995) estimate the net annual
gains to travelers from airline deregulation at US$18.4 billion (1993 dollars).' 1
In the telecommunications sector in the United States, long-distance telephone rates as
of 1996 have decreased by more than 70 percent since the divestiture of AT&T in 1984
(Taylor and Taylor,  1993; Wall Street Journal,  1991).  The examples of cellular telephony
and voice messaging in the United States illustrate how regulation can also slow the
introduction of new products and discourage innovation.  While the cellular concept was
discussed in the late 1940s and was clearly available in  1973, it was only in 1983 that the
FCC began to issue licenses using a non-market mechanism. That delay in licensing cellular
telecommunications cost the U.S. economy more than US$25 billion per year (1983 dollars)
(Rohlfs, Jackson and Kelly,  1991).12 These losses were about 2 percent of GDP in 1983
when cellular service began.  Similarly, the delay in introducing voice ffiessaging services
cost more than US$1.3 billion (1994 dollars) per year (Hausman and Tardiff,  1996).
8  Average  unit costs dropped  dramatically  after deregulation,  from US$0.3 dollars  per ton-mile in 1977
(pre-deregulation)  to US$0.1 dollars  per ton-mile  in 1983 (post-deregulation)  (1977 dollars). After deregulation,
many of the inefficient  were forced to leave the industry,  leaving behind  those firms with low unit costs
(McMullen  and Stanley, 1988).
9  For example,  work force reductions  at American  Airlines  and United Airlines were 17 and 24
percent, respectively.
10  Under  regulation, the 3.0 percent annual decline  in unit costs for U.S. airlines was way below the 4.5
percent decline  of non-U.S. airlines from 1970  to 1975. Following  deregulation,  from 1978  to 1983, costs of
U.S. airlines fell by 3.3 percent compared  to 2.8 percent for non-U.S. airlines.
1"  The authors estimate  that consumers  are gaining US$12.4  billion  annually  from lower fares under
deregulation  and US$10.3  billion from greater  flight frequency. While increases  in travel restrictions,  travel
time, load factors and the number  of connections  have reduced  consumer  welfare,the  annual gains to travelers
are substantial.
12  In addition,  the expenditures  to obtain  those licenses  cost society  between  US$500  million  and US$1
billion.19
Similar post-deregulation  effects have been observed  in other sectors, such as stock
exchanges  and banking, where deregulation  has improved  productivity  and lowered  unit
costs.  For example, when stock  brokerage fees were deregulated,  rates dropped  by 25
percent' 3, and the overall consolidation  and cost reduction were 30 percent in the sector
(Jarrell, 1984).  "  While firms may have changed the services offered, a number of studies
have shown that even after accounting  for changes in service, cost reductions were
significant.
The productivity  gains secured by U.S. banks following  partial deregulation  of the
banking and savings  and loan sectors have also been significant. Jobs decreased  more than
20 percent in the sector during the 1984-93  period, and productivity  (as measured  by revenue
per employee)  increased  by more than 300 percent throughout  the same period (Guasch and
Spiller, 1997).  At the same time, there was a serious problem with the monitoring  of
financial institutions  during this period, which resulted in some major financial  losses (White,
1991). The large losses stemmed  in part from regulators  not taking appropriate  actions.
While the database outside  the United States is less extensive, there is reason to
believe that the gains from deregulation  of many industries  elsewhere could be substantial
(see Table 4).  For example, lifting price and entry restrictions  on air travel in Europe could
lead to substantial  gains for consumers. Table 7 provides some  price information  for trips of
similar length and demand characteristics. The table suggests  that fares for trips are roughly
twice as expensive  in Europe as in the United States. And despite the higher fares, the
profitability  of many of the European  companies  is way below that of the U.S. carriers.
Indeed, the European  high-cost  carriers, such as Iberia and Air France (both state owned),
have survived  until now only with government  aid.  Good, R6ller, and Sickles (1993) argue
that liberalization  would lead to competition  between international  carriers and a convergence
of cost structures. They estimate that, in 1986, if the European  airline industry  were as
efficient as the U.S. airline industry  they would  have achieved  cost savings of approximately
US$4 billion (1986 dollars).
13  For orders in excess  of 10,000  shares, rates fell in excess  of 50 percent.
14  Employment  went from 260,000 in 1987  to 190,000  in 1990.20
Table 7
Fare Comparison  of Similar U.S. and European  Routes
Route  Miles  Fare
Boston  to New York  187  $153
London to Paris  211  $263
Washington  to New York  216  $153
Houston  to New Orleans  302  $89
Copenhagen  to Oslo  311  $315
Dallas  to Minneapolis  853  $435
Frankfurt to Madrid  887  $720
Source: Airfare  Management  Unit (1995, 1996)  and Consulting  Services  Group (1995, 1996)
Table 8
The Effects of Too Much (Protective)  Energy Regulation  in the
I___________  European Community
Country  Cosf  Country  Cost
Germany  12  France  7
Italy  10  Netherlands  7
Portugal  10  United  States  7
Belgium  9  Greece  7
Spain  9  Denmark  6
Britain  8  Finland  6
Luxembourg  8  Norway  5
Ireland  7  Sweden  4
a  Cost of electricity  rounded  to the nearest cent per kilowatt-hour.
Source: Electricity  Association  Services  Ltd. (1996)21
There are also significant  opportunities  for gains in deregulating  electricity  markets.
Table 8 show electricity  prices in Europe and the United States. To the extent these prices
reflect incremental  costs, there are likely to be significant  gains from reducing  entry barriers
into different  markets. For example, strict regulations  in Germany  require domestic
companies  to purchase electricity  from regional  producers, even though lower cost power is
often available  nearby.  The extent of the potential  gains for consumers  is difficult to
estimate,  but in the United  Kingdom,  energy deregulation  resulted in a 70 percent increase  in
productivity  and an 18-21  percent reduction in franchise  contract prices (Organization  for
Economic  Cooperation  and Development, 1996b)." 5 The absence of similar deregulation  in
other European Union countries  has led to firms paying over 50 percent more for their
electricity  than do their American  counterparts. Moreover, the impact of higher energy
prices on the overall economy  can be quite significant  (Navarro, 1996).16
Developing Countries
The evidence of the adverse impact of economic regulation on productivity and
efficiency can serve as a lesson for developing countries.  Lower productivity in regulated
industries translates into higher costs for products and inputs produced domestically, thus
reducing a country's  ability to pursue a successful export-led growth strategy.  The precise
impact of regulation on developing country economies is difficult to estimate in many cases.
Yet,  data from the developed world and a few studies in developing countries suggest that
the potential welfare gains from regulatory reform could be quite significant.
For countries that have deregulated the efficiency gains have been quite significant.
For example, deregulation of entry into the long distance telephone market in Chile has cut
rates by 50 percent,  making them close to U.S.  rates (Guasch and Spiller,  1997).  Allowing
for private  sector participation in the telecommunications sector has cut waiting time for
installation of new lines from a minimum of two years to a matter of weeks in Latin
American countries.  Similarly, in the port sector, the opening of the port terminals in
Buenos Aires to competition has led to an 80 percent reduction of the fees.  Also, the opening
of stevedoring operations to multiple parties in the port of Montevideo has increased
productivity by 300 percent.17 All those results were achieved within a year of deregulation
(Guasch,  1996).
15  Franchise  contract  prices from generators  to distributing  companies  have fallen  by 21 percent in real
terms and those to direct industrial  and commercial  consumers  by 18 percent in real terms.
16  For example,  a 30 percent increase  in electricity  prices tends to raise the price of goods such as paper
and pulp, metals, chemicals  and glass by roughly 2.5 percent.
1"  Comparable  measures  in the port of Guayaquil,  Ecuador  have decreased  costs by 60 percent and
increased  productivity  by 55 percent.22
A study of Argentina, summarized in Table 9, assesses the welfare cost of regulations
and other government interventions in the 1980s (Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas
Latinoamericanas,  1991). The total costs of regulation and state intervention amount to over
US$4 billion per  year (1990 dollars),  and this is only for the selective listed interventions.
While the measure of costs for different activities differ somewhat (e.g.,  efficiency costs,
additional cost to consumers,  and subsidy cost), the overall total suggests that the cost of
government intervention is significant.
It would be useful to assemble data on regulatory costs in other developing countries
that is comparable to that assembled for Argentina.  Yet, there is no shortage of specific
cases where economic regulation has had adverse consequences.  For example, Uruguayan
firms and consumers are paying an implicit tax of at least 30 percent for water, phone and
electricity (Estache,  1996).  This implicit tax exceeds that of other countries in Mercosur,
thus hindering the competitiveness of Uruguayan products vis a vis those of other Mercosur
countries.  In Brazil, economic regulation has also reduced efficiency.  For example,
although trucking costs are almost three times as high as rail,  rail transport has only a 12
percent share of relatively short trips and a negligible 3 percent  share in the longer haul
interregional market.  The absence of an inverse relationship between cost and market share
is to a large extent attributable to inefficient regulation.  Additional anecdotal evidence of
regulation and of its impact in developing countries is quite ample, as shown in Boxes 3 and
4.
The costs of various kinds of process regulation can also be substantial in developing
countries, due to inefficient bureaucracies and high levels of corruption.  For example,
customs administration in many countries tends to be plagued by inefficiency and corruption,
imposing a high cost to traded goods." 9 Surveys in a number of developing countries
indicates that, the proportion of time managers spend in managing process regulation, ranges
between 10-30 percent of their time and imputed costs on produced goods or services due to
process regulation, are in the 5-15 percent range (World Bank,  1997).
The available evidence underscores the significant gains that developing countries can
secure by further deregulating their economies and reducing the costs of process regulation.
Estimates of those gains vary form country to country, but are a least a few percentage
points of GDP (Chisari, Estache and Romero,  1996; Guasch and Spiller 1997).
,x  Mercosur  is a free trade area for Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.
19  According to the Nigeria Manufacturers'  Association, pernission  to clear goods in that country has
to go through 27 stages and the process takes 5-8 weeks (Nigeria Manufacturers Association,  1996).  These
numbers are not uncommon in others developing countries.23
Table  9
Examples  of the  Costs of Regulation  in Argentinaa
(in Millions  of 1991  US Dollars)  l
Period  Average Annual
Cost
Financial  System  1987  1,000
$  High reserve requirements and subsidized credit by the central  1983-1987  670
bank
$  Inflation taxes on checking accounts
1977-1987  350
Fuel price controls
Health Services  1986  150
$  Extra costs from double affiliation  1987  172
$  Idle capacity in public hospitals  l
1986-1987  12
Fishing  export subsidies  l
1984  104
Efficiency costs from domestic consumption  restrictions in cattle
markets
1987  30




Restrictions on rail transport of cement, wine and grain
Truck transport  1987  100
$  Costs of road deterioration  1987  30
$  Costs of provincial regulations in the transport of grains
1987  90
Port restrictions on price and entry
1965-1987  1,200
Regulations imposed on business
1987  120
Regulations  on employment  in the public sector
a  The costs of regulation  presented  in this table measure  different  concepts, such as efficiency  losses in the
economy,  cost premiums  to consumers,  tax reductions  and subsidies. Thus, it might  not be technically  correct
to total them.
Source: Fundacion  de Investigaciones  Economicas  Latinoamericanas  (1991)24
Box 3
Montevideo Taxicab Market
Entry restrictions in the taxicab market in Montevideo,  have induced a market price of a taxicab
license in 1990 of some US$60,000  (in 1990 dollars). While lower than the US$125,000  price in
New York, lower Uruguayan  per capita income means that the market value of the license as a
proportion of per capita income is more than four times higher in Montevideo  than in New York.
The regulation of the taxicab market has led to a scarcity of taxicabs-reflected  in difficulty in
hailing  taxicabs in the downtown  area and in long waits when requested  by telephone,  in high costs
borne  by  consumers, and  in  capture and  wasteful rent-seeking activity by  the  taxi-owners
association.
Source: Guasch  and Spiller (1997)
Box 4
Municipal Regulation in Peru
In one municipality,  companies  are required by law to fumigate their factories once every year.
The municipality  has licensed only one firm as the official fumigator. While its prices are double
that of other fumigation  companies  and its service is very poor, it is the only fumigator that can
issue a certificate  of compliance  with the regulations.
Source: Guasch and Spiller (1997)25
V.  Conclusions
In this concluding section, we provide a brief summary of our understanding of the
benefits and costs of regulation.  In addition, we offer some policy recommendations aimed
at developing countries, but which also have relevance to developed countries.
The review of the literature on the benefits and costs demonstrates that it is possible
to systematically explore the costs and benefits of regulatory activity using standard economic
analysis.  Moreover,  this analysis can serve as a useful aid to policy makers (Arrow et al.,
1996).  It also showed that regulation can have a significant adverse impact on economic
growth and welfare.  Specifically, regulation aimed at controlling prices and entry into
markets that would otherwise be workably competitive is likely to reduce the average
standard of living.  In addition, process regulation that is unnecessary can impose a
significant cost on the economy.  Nonetheless, social regulations may have significant net
benefits for the average consumer.  At the same time, these regulations may not meet goals
in an effective manner and in some cases may result in a net decline in living standards.
This underscores the importance of doing economic analysis that will enhance the quality of
regulations.
While this paper has focused on the economic impact of regulations on the average
individual or the entire economy, it is important to recognize that regulations may be needed
in some cases to achieve other social goals.  Indeed, some regulations may be desirable from
a social point of view,  even if they have an adverse impact on economic growth.  For
example, providing medical assistance and food for society's poor may not increase
economic growth, but may be the correct policy for social and moral reasons. Similarly,
helping to reduce discrimination may or may not increase economic growth, but it is a
correct policy in principle.  Even when such policies are justified for other reasons, their
economic impact should be assessed so they can be implemented in the most effective
manner.
Compared with budgets,  regulations receive relatively little scrutiny.  This is partly
because politicians wish to hide the cost of regulation from citizens, and partly because it is
more difficult to estimate the costs and benefits of regulation.  Information on the economic
impacts of different approaches to regulation needs to be improved in order to enhance public
decision-making.  Fortunately,  several countries are beginning to place more emphasis on
developing a better information base on the costs and benefits of regulation (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development,  1995).2°
20  Analyses, such as those contained  in Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development
(1995), can be helpful in assessing  the strengths  and weaknesses  of different  administrative  approaches  to
regulation.26
There are several policies developing countries might consider adopting to improve
their general approach to regulation.  The recommendations here are purposely general.  In
that spirit, the first important point to recognize is that effective policies will differ across
countries.  The appropriate regulatory tool and framework will depend on several factors,
including bureaucratic expertise, resource availability, political constraints and economic
impacts.
There is a general need, however,  to enhance the capability for evaluating regulation
at local and national levels.  This need is illustrated by the absence of even rudimentary data
in several developed and developing countries on the impacts of regulation.  Even rough
calculations of regulatory  costs, such as the one completed for Canada, can be quite
beneficial in developing a reform strategy.  Countries should attempt to develop a
"regulatory budget"  that would show the economic impacts of regulations.  This budget could
be published along with the government's  fiscal budget.  Such a capability will take time to
develop.
Several jurisdictions,  including some in developing countries, are putting procedures
in place that would require a benefit-cost analysis for significant regulations.  We believe this
will have a constructive impact on public policy by providing better information and holding
government officials and political leaders more accountable.  In the short term,  it is
important for agencies charged with administering regulations to begin assembling crude cost
and benefit data.  For example, an agency could specify the rationale for a proposed
regulation, the likely direct and indirect costs, a qualitative description of benefits, an
assessment of other alternatives, including the status quo, and an explanation of why other
alternatives were not selected if they are likely to be better for the average citizen.
Such analyses should not be overly burdensome.  For "small" regulations,  no analysis
may be necessary.  For regulations having potentially "large" economic impacts, more
resources should be devoted to evaluation.  Ideally, such analyses should be both prospective
and retrospective,  so that analysts can learn how to improve their impact assessments.  To
get the process started, however,  the emphasis should be on developing an information
management system that is low-cost and implementable.  It is extremely important to get
front-line agencies involved in the process,  so that they become more sensitive to the
economy-wide impacts of their proposals.
As administrative capabilities evolve, large regulations and regulatory reforms should
be subjected to a more thorough cost-benefit analysis.  These analyses should be an important
factor in decision making.  In the case of economic regulation, the burden of proof should be
on those that wish to maintain it, since the case for most economic regulation is weak in
terms of economic efficiency.  In the case of social regulation, flexibility should be
encouraged so that consumers and producers are able to innovate in response to regulations.
Thus, for example, performance standards for meeting a pollution goal are generally
preferred to standards that dictate the use of a particular technology.  Of course, the amount27
of flexibility in a regulatory policy should be based,  in part,  on the ability of the
administrative agency to effectively implement the policy (Hartman and Wheeler,  1995).
While economic analysis can be helpful, its limitations need to be recognized. As
noted earlier,  the costs and benefits of regulatory policies are often quite uncertain.  This
uncertainty stems, in part,  from a lack of analysis of specific policies.  An important part,
however, stems from a fundamental inability to predict how regulations will actually affect
behavior.  Regulations often have unexpected and perverse consequences (Ackerman and
Hassler,  1981).  Thus, when regulating one should proceed with extreme care and err on the
side of less regulation, particularly when considering economic regulation.
Where there is no clear economic rationale for a regulatory policy, these policies
should be removed.  There are many policies involving licensing and price or quota
intervention in developed and developing countries that do not serve the public interest
(Huber and Thorne,  1997; Guasch and Spiller,  1997).  Examples include applications for
license and license renewals where the government's  primary function is to transfer political
favors to their preferred constituencies.  Removal of such barriers may not be simple in
many cases,  and may involve making resource transfers to politically powerful
constituencies.
A great deal more thought needs to be given to the design of regulatory  frameworks.
In some instances, even where deregulation is justified,  partial deregulation may not lead to
an improvement over the status quo.  For example, removing price restrictions but retaining
entry barriers could lead to inefficient pricing.  Full deregulation can lead to problems with
monopoly, unless great care is taken in managing the transition to a deregulated environment
is accomplished.  The point here is that the strategy for regulatory  reform is critical to the
effectiveness of the reform.
Another serious design issue relates to the bureaucratic problem of  "tunnel vision,"
or the tendency of a single mission agency, such as health,  education or the environment, to
only consider its mandate.  If an agency only considers its mandate, it will naturally tend to
overstate the benefits of its program and understate the costs.  As noted above, one way to
address this problem is to require the agency to develop more data on the costs of specific
regulatory proposals.  A second is to limit the agency's mandate.  Others include sunset
requirements that would limit an agency's authority to a fixed time period, unless renewed by
a legislature; and having a central agency review and approve or disapprove proposed
regulations.  Such an agency should be designed so that it has some independence, and so
that it is primarily concerned with the economy-wide impacts of regulations.
Finally, there is a natural tendency for regulators to write regulations that are unduly
complicated.  This complexity allows bureaucrats and lawyers to have more power.  It also
makes it difficult for average people to understand the implications of regulations.  It is
important to make regulations more transparent because greater transparency is likely to
reduce corruption.  Moreover,  careful scrutiny of regulation, content and constant benefits28
would diminish the likelihood of political capture by interest groups.  Greater transparency  is
likely to increase the perceived legitimacy of the system.  The move toward greater
transparency will only occur as people begin to appreciate some of the hidden costs of
regulation.
In a few instances, developing countries have begun to realize the benefits of
reforming economic regulation.  These is clearly great potential in many other developed and
developing countries.  Still, in the area of social regulation, much remains to be done in most
developing countries.  Yet, it is beginning to appear on the policy agenda, if not from
domestic pressure,  then from interest groups in developed countries.  Thus as developing
countries begin to address those issues, they need to think carefully about designing effective
and efficient regulatory approaches given their resource constraints.
The overall lesson is not that regulation is generally undesirable,  but that it often has
undesirable economic consequences.  Moreover,  these impacts result partly from political
forces that lead to certain kinds of wealth redistribution (Stigler,  1971).  While not denying
such forces, we believe they can be mitigated by more sharply evaluating the consequences
and tradeoffs involved in regulating before a regulatory policy is set in stone.References
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